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The first is an epistemic sense of ‘subjective’ that provides an account
of choice given the constraint of limited resources despite unlimited wants.
The second is an ontological sense of subjective that describes the eco-
nomic character of things as dependent on human acts of valuing.
Carl Menger advanced this account of the subjective theory of value in
his Principles of Economics, first published in 1871. The significance of his
contribution lies in the transcategorical description of social phenomena.
While most accounts reduce value either to the mind or to some intrinsic
property of things, Menger demonstrated that all social phenomena was
composed of varying combinations of beliefs and entities, judgments and
facts, mind and matter. In order to achieve such a transcategorial account
of value, Menger first provided an epistemic account of economic valua-
tion by grounding his analysis on the experience of the valuing individual.
Second, he provided a description of exact laws of economic phenomena,
thus advancing an ontology of economic objects. The achievement of such
a theoretical account of value could not have been reached without the
recognition that, barring exact laws, there could not be any science of eco-
nomics, and without any sort of empirical realism, economics could not
rightfully be called a social science. What will be useful, then, in the task of
tackling the question of truth in economic valuation is to explore how
Menger employs the notion of subjectivism both epistemically and
ontologically.3
Epistemic Sense of Subjective
When considering the epistemic sense of subjective economic value,
we must keep in mind two features of the economic species of value. First,
the economic judgments that individuals make indicate the extent to which
they believe an object may satisfy their needs. According to Menger, an
individual makes an economic judgment on the basis of the causal con-
nection he perceives between a thing and the satisfaction of a mediate or
immediate end. Accordingly, an individual’s judgment directed at a thing
has an interested nature since his evaluation of the thing involves an ex-
pectation of what the thing will fulfill for him.
Second, the judgment is called ‘economic’ because it involves an evalu-
ation directed at making a choice among known alternatives. Every choice
involves important elements of scarcity, such as limited time, income, pro-
ductive resources, physical and intellectual limitations, levels of satiety,
and so on. Coping with scarcity is a fundamental feature of the human
condition that involves the allocation of means to meet ends. Menger was
The Problem of Subjectivism
The notion of ‘subjectivism’ has a significant place in the body of eco-
nomic theory, most notably in the theory of subjective value.1 There is,
however, one concern that some philosophers have raised about truth in
normative judgments that puts economic subjectivism seriously into ques-
tion.2 This concern can be articulated as the following question: Is there
truth regarding economic value judgments? The answer to this question is
pertinent not only for an improved understanding of economic value
theory but to such philosophical investigations as realism, epistemology,
ontology, and ethics. Nonetheless, the answer is not readily available in
the body of economic theory. The ensuing discussion will explore the is-
sue of whether the truth of economic judgments can be settled objectively
and, if so, how truth is made known.
What Is Subjective Economic Value?
Subjectivism is commonly predicated on normative expressions of
beliefs, attitudes, and emotions by a judging subject. In economics, how-
ever, the meaning of subjectivism is more complex. When economists
speak of the value of economic goods as subjective, they not only refer to
a judgment by an economic agent but also to the status of the object to
which the judgment is directed. There are, then, two senses of subjective:
1. The evaluation of an object perceived by an individual as having a
causal connection with the satisfaction of an end.
2. The subject-dependent status of objects in their role as economic
goods.
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people in the same way that subjective values help the individual to coor-
dinate the parts of his plan.”7
Yet, suppose that there is counterfeit money in an economy. Economic
agents might be fooled by the token objects they believe to be genuine
members of the type-category “money.” One way to analyze this problem
is to attribute the cause to subjectivism. In other words, the criticism would
be that any token object is arbitrarily designated to be a member of a type-
category such as “money” by simply believing it to be so. This criticism,
however, is mistaken since it misconstrues the notion of subjectivism in
economic judgments. A better way to view this problem is to consider that
an error in a judgment directed at an object does not modify the object
such that the object becomes what we believe it to be. As we shall see in
the ensuing discussion of the ontological sense of subjective economic
value, universal categories such as “money” are objectively describable by
exact laws such that a counterfeit dollar bill is not a genuine instance of
the category “money.” What is important to this epistemic analysis is that
instances of error in our knowledge of objects do not alter the object by
shaping it according to our mistaken beliefs any more than a false token
of a type-category alters the category itself. We have thus come to the thresh-
old of the second sense of subjective in Menger’s theoretical account of
economic value.
The Ontological Sense of Subjective
Menger developed a complex ontology of social objects that have a
unique nature. According to Menger, economic objects are not merely de-
scribable by their physical properties since, for example, money is not re-
ducible to the paper, metal, plastic, or electronic components that comprise
the various kinds of currency we acknowledge as money.8 In fact, there is
no single physical property that is common to all the members of the
class of objects we call money. But what makes a dollar bill money or,
more generally, what makes any one thing an economic good, is a combi-
nation of two things. First, the views we hold about things as economic
objects.9 Second, the exact laws governing the categories of economic ob-
jects. Each of these requires some careful elaboration.
Concerning our views about things, the economic character attributed
to the thing to which the judgment is directed depends on the perceived
significance of the thing in relation to an end. In Menger’s analysis, we
find a distinction between things and economic goods that shows us how
the first to ground the analysis of economic value on the notion of scar-
city.4 If there is no perceived scarcity, the judgment is not an economic
judgment.5
Since an economic judgment of value is subjective, its truth or falsity
cannot be settled by an objective appeal to facts observed by a third party.
This does not imply, however, that we may never be wrong in our eco-
nomic judgments. Menger acknowledged error as the most fundamental
epistemological problem.6 If we can err, there must be judgments that are
false. Parenthetically, it is also worth mentioning that the discovery of er-
ror in our judgments suggests that the fulfillment of expectations corre-
sponds to putative features of the object toward which our judgment is
directed. It may be the case, then, that the truth of an economic judgment
can be settled objectively by facts about the object that correspond to the
individual’s expectations. Clearly, no one but the acting subject could make
this determination.
The problem with erroneous judgments, to return to the issue of error,
is that we only discover our mistakes ex post, sometimes immediately after
and sometimes long after a choice has been made. However, we must also
consider the case that the agent remains forever fooled by an apparent
fulfillment of his expectations. Suppose, for example, that Oedipus dies
before finding out that Jocasta, the woman he loved and married, was his
mother. In this case, Oedipus never learns of his error, so he dies convinced
that his expectations of love have been fulfilled. Objectively speaking, how-
ever, there are facts in the world, such as the identity of Jocasta as his mother,
that are not in agreement with his expectations.
The question that immediately comes to mind is this: If agents are not
likely to find out whether their economic judgments are true, at least in
time to make corrections, can any kind of individual economic planning
ever be possible? This question addresses a central problem in economics
regarding the dispersed nature of knowledge. The problem is not that
knowledge is dispersed but, rather, that there might be systemic obstacles
to acquiring knowledge of the facts relevant to the economic activity of
individuals. Such systemic obstacles are always the result of the constraints
imposed by economic systems that do not allow for unfettered exchange.
Conversely, in free-market systems, prices serve as the medium of com-
munication of facts relevant to economic activity. As Hayek writes, “In a
system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among
many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different163 Markets & Morality 162 Truth in Economic Subjectivism
Since we have now completed the first task of identifying what makes
subjects hold economic views concerning particular objects, we can move
on to the explanation of the second task of describing the categories to
which economic objects belong. Menger advanced exact laws for classify-
ing economic kinds such as money, value, price, capital, and exchange.
Without doing a survey of all of the economic categories in Menger’s analy-
sis, we may get a glimpse of his ontological enterprise by presenting the
method he used.
For Menger, economic kinds have an intrinsic intelligibility since hu-
man beings discover their essence in everyday social activities of an eco-
nomic nature. In his theoretical framework, Menger was able to reconcile
the subject-dependent status of economic phenomena with the objectiv-
ity of description concerning the nature of such phenomena. Since all eco-
nomic phenomena is not of the same kind, it was important for Menger
to advance a description of categories such as money, price, capital, and so
on. Unfortunately, however, Menger’s elaborate description of economic
kinds is often cumbersome to read and lacking suitable names for the
distinguishing features and conditions belonging to each category. The
inadequate attention given to Menger’s ontology of economic objects is
due in no small measure to his difficult style of writing. Nevertheless, his
description is significant because it offers the truth-making conditions for
settling objectively whether the views individuals have about an instance
of an economic kind indeed correspond to that kind.
For example, suppose that individuals in Peru buy dollar bills in the
black market because they think that the dollar has greater stability than
the Sol, the Peruvian currency. Further, suppose that some of these dollar
bills are counterfeit but the individuals view them as genuine money.
Clearly, their views do not affect the nature of the objects they believe to
be money. In other words, they have, in effect, purchased very expensive
paper but not money. Although the acceptance of a currency as money is
one of the conditions for the category “money” in Menger’s ontological
description, it is not the only condition.  As the case of counterfeit money
should make clear, individuals may be wrong in their recognition of genu-
ine token instances of commonly-accepted currency.14 Custom and prac-
tice will create certain commonly held beliefs about the usefulness of
type-categories, such as U.S. dollars, based on marketability. But tokens
that look like instances of U.S. dollars are not always money. There are,
Menger writes, legal orders that have an influence on the money-character
of token instances of money. In our present nationalized money systems,
a thing acquires an economic character and is thus perceived as an eco-
nomic good.10 Accordingly, there are certain conditions:
1. A judging subject must perceive a thing as scarce, in relation to his
total supply of the thing.
2. Hence, the thing is evaluated in relation to an end known to the
judging subject as more urgent than any other end.  Otherwise, scarcity
would not be an issue at all.
3.  The thing thus acquires an importance to the judging subject in rela-
tion to his unmet need or want since the judging subject perceives a causal
connection between the thing and the fulfillment of his need or want. It is
with the association of the judging subject’s expectations to the thing that
the thing acquires its economic character, i.e., it becomes an economic
good.
4. Finally, we must not neglect the judging subject’s belief that he has a
feasible command of the thing sufficient to be able to direct it to the sat-
isfaction of his need or want. If, for example, the subject merely wishes to
own a castle but he knows that this wish is beyond his means, then the
castle is a thing merely desired on occasion. Unless he evaluates the castle
as a serious alternative in making a choice directed at fulfilling a need or
want, the castle does not enter into any economic valuation and, thus, it
does not acquire an economic character.11
What these conditions describe is the subject-dependent mode of ex-
istence of a thing as an economic good. Hence, the economic character of
a good cannot be instantiated in a thing apart from a judging mind. Now,
this analysis applies not just to material objects but also to intangible ends,
such as acquiring an education, acting virtuously, making friends, and find-
ing love. These intangible ends almost always have tangible objects as
mediate ends.12
We act economically in our attempts to meet any of these ends, not
just those of the mundane sort or, as commonly believed, those that in-
volve money or are employed in production. An important implication of
this analysis is that the province of economics is broader than what is
typically believed. Subjects, for example, can acquire an economic prop-
erty if we evaluate them in an interested way, such as wanting to meet
them, to know them, to spend time with them, to make friends with them,
or to marry them. Chicago economists Gary Becker and George Stigler
have advanced interesting theories of love and marriage consistent with
this economic framework.13165 Markets & Morality 164 Truth in Economic Subjectivism
of interpreting it. By contrast, economic subjectivism is consistent with
philosophical realism.
Furthermore, economic judgments are not arbitrary in the sense that
economic agents can arbitrarily designate any object to be whatever he
believes it to be. Let us recall from the earlier discussion of exact laws that
the economic categories to which genuine instances of these categories
belong are not determinable by the wishing or believing of agents. Ac-
cording to economic theory, economic categories obey exact laws that are
intrinsically intelligible.
The Problem of Error
The problem of error needs to be addressed once again. We may be
wrong in our economic judgments because our knowledge of things in
the world is not always in agreement with how things actually are.  A for-
tiori, economic judgments depend on minds for their existence, but they
do not depend on minds for their truth. Therefore, truth in economic judg-
ments is not dependent on the subject’s knowledge of the correspondence
between his expectations and the facts about the object to which his judg-
ment is directed. There are very few facts of which we may be indubitably
certain.17 The rest of the facts that are not fully given in knowledge are
known to us only with varying degrees of certainty.
Moral Relativism
Perhaps the most troublesome criticism advanced against economic
subjectivism is the charge that it is either consistent with, or an endorse-
ment of, moral relativism. This criticism, however, conflates economic
value with moral value, two wholly distinct species of value. Epistemically
speaking, economic judgments are distinct from moral judgments in the
sense that while the former is an interested judgment, the latter is not.
Although many, if not most, actions are economic actions, not all eco-
nomic actions are morally relevant. There are certain actions that are only
economically relevant. If, for example, I decide to purchase a hat and have
to decide between a red one and a yellow one, this action has no moral
relevance. There are also certain actions that are only morally relevant. An
act of forgiveness has no economic relevance.18 But if my decision is be-
tween buying a hat and donating money to the poor, then this action has
two aspects. It has an economic aspect since I have limited resources and I
can allocate these resources to only one of the two choices. It also has a
moral aspect since being charitable is morally relevant. Frequently, in fact,
it is only by means of the sanction of the state that any one token instance
of money has “the attribute of being a universal substitute in exchange.”15
This is an important fact in the description of money that offers an objec-
tive means to determine real money from counterfeit money, indepen-
dently of the views or beliefs of individuals in particular instances.
Truth in Economic Judgments
Having laid out the epistemic sense of subjective in economic judg-
ments, and the ontological or subject-dependent status of economic goods,
I will offer the following answer to the initial question in this paper, i.e., Is
there truth regarding economic judgments?
The truth of a subject’s judgment pertaining to the economic value of a good
corresponds to facts in the world about the thing in its role as economic good and
the agreement such facts have with the subject’s expectation of such a thing.
This statement presents, in a concise way, the ontological and epistemic
senses of subjective. On the one hand, an economic object is a subjective
entity since its mode of existence depends on it being perceived by a sub-
ject as ‘economic’. On the other hand, the judgment that the agent makes
regarding the economic object is subjective but its truth or falsity can be
settled objectively by the correspondence of the judgment with facts in
the world.16 My answer, I believe, follows easily from Menger’s framework.
The upshot of all this is that Menger’s contributions provide us with an
ample crop of ideas from which we can draw a rich ontology of subject-
dependent economic objects and an epistemology that is both realist and
consistent with a correspondence theory of truth. Having answered the
initial question posed at the beginning of this paper, let us briefly survey
some philosophical consequences that may be drawn from our discus-
sion of economic subjectivism.
Arbitrariness and Cognitive Relativism
It should be clear by now that the way in which the term subjective is
employed in economics is not as a predicate of judgments that are pro-
duced by a particular state of mind, such as feelings or attitudes, which
have little or nothing to do with facts, real objects, or states of affairs in
the world. This kind of subjectivism is more akin to cognitive relativism:
the view that the world has no objective properties but just different ways167 Markets & Morality 166 Truth in Economic Subjectivism
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we may find that judgments that are beneficial from an economic, self-
interested perspective, are also wrong from a moral perspective. Having a
new hat would be economically beneficial for me since it would add a
nice accessory to my wardrobe. However, from a moral perspective, it might
be seen as a frivolous choice in light of my knowledge of someone’s need
for food. Since economic judgments involve a set of considerations that
are orthogonal to those involved in moral judgments, there is no neces-
sary relation between economic value and moral value.
The argument for truth in economic judgments, however, has a signifi-
cant philosophical import to ethics. If economic judgments can correspond
to facts and thus instantiate truth, then other normative judgments, such
as moral judgments, can be similarly consistent with realism. For example,
consider the following: The truth of a moral judgment may be instanti-
ated in the correspondence of the moral agent’s intuition of the action as
a good action and the objective essence of the act as a morally good act.
This can be construed as a defense of moral realism.
Ontologically speaking, the objective essence of a moral act can be ei-
ther good or evil, right or wrong, depending on the context. It is the context
of the moral act that will identify the moral category to which it belongs.
Killing is wrong, but if I kill in self-defense, then the act might not belong
to the moral category “killing.” Instead, it may fall into another category
such as “defending life,” “protecting life,” or some other designation. Clearly,
these desultory remarks on moral value are inadequate to the complexity
of this topic. Nonetheless, this brief analysis of the philosophical conse-
quences of economic subjectivism shed light on the possibility of import-
ing economic realism into the sphere of ethics in the form of moral realism.
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